January 19, 2009
One hundred thirty-seventh session. The Public Prosecutor’s Office continued to present its arguments in order to prove Fujimori had command responsibility for the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta crimes as well as the kidnapping of journalist Gustavo Gorriti and businessman Samuel Dyer.
During this session, the Public Prosecutor explained that Fujimori was the head of the power system within the National Intelligence Service (SIN) and was thus the only person who could secure impunity for the members of the Colina Military Detachment. Fujimori’s principal defense lawyer, César Nakazaki, was also present during this session.
I. Public Prosecutor’s allegations
Avelino Guillén, representing the Public Prosecutor’s Office during this session, presented the following allegations:
Fujimori’s direct orders to Montesinos
Guillén argued that Fujimori ordered his presidential advisor, Vladimiro Montesinos, to have control over the intelligence offices in order to apply a dirty war against subversive groups. Thus Montesinos received direct orders from Fujimori and took charge of carrying them out.
Furthermore, from the time that Fujimori assumed the presidency in 1990, Montesinos had access to the intelligence offices in the Armed Forces and designated the office chiefs who would later be involved in the Colina Military Detachment’s work, including:
1. Víctor Raúl Silva Mendoza, head of the Army Intelligence Service (SIE).
2. Juan Nolberto Rivero Lazo, head of the Army Intelligence Office (DINTE).
3. Julio Salazar Monroe, head of the SIN.
The Public Prosecutor stressed that Rivero and Salazar were appointed by supreme resolutions, which were signed by Fujimori while he was president, thus he “cannot say that he didn’t know of their being appointed.”
Control over intelligence offices
Continuing, the Public Prosecutor argued: “Vladimiro Montesinos’ control of the Army Intelligence Service, Army Intelligence Office and National Intelligence Service was Fujimori’s decision in order for a dirty war to be implemented and applied.”
The Public Prosecutor confirmed that the Fujimori gave the order from the SIN, where the power system was applied.
The Public Prosecutor consequently argued that Fujimori ordered for Montesinos to administer, control and direct the power system’s budget from within the SIN in order for Colina to have sufficient resources to fulfill its assignments.
Therefore 85 percent of the SIN’s budget was “reserved expenditures”: “accounting, pay slips to collaborators and payrolls all prove Colina’s sustained activity.”
Montesinos and Peruvian Army
The Public Prosecutor explained that Fujimori gave orders to Montesinos to have control over the Armed Forces, particularly the Peruvian Army: “Alberto Fujimori had control over the Army through Vladimiro Montesinos, thus the Colina Detachment had ample military backing, especially from military chiefs that formed part of the power system.”
Furthermore, it was Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos who confirmed that Montesinos was a “valid spokesperson” for military officials.
II. Outside the Courtroom
Montesinos sentenced for illegal transactions to the SIN
On Friday, Jan. 16, the Peruvian Judicial Power sentenced Vladimiro Montesinos to six years and four months in prison for embezzlement (article 387) and destruction of public documents (article 430), for having moved funds from the Armed Forces to the SIN.
Montesinos admitted his responsibility and the crimes he was charged with, invoking the legal benefit of an anticipated sentence. Thus Montesinos — Fujimori’s former personal advisor — admitted there was an illegal transfer of funds to the SIN, which contradicts what Fujimori’s defense has argued in his current human rights trial. Fujimori’s defense contends that all counter-subversion efforts were completely legal and each order given by Fujimori or any SIN authorities was given through signed documents.
III. Next session
The Court announced that the next session will take place on Jan. 21, where the Public Prosecutor’s Office will continue presenting its final arguments.