(Court President, César San Martín. Photo: Judicial Power)
September 15, 2008
One-hundredth session. Anthropologist Carlos Iván Degregori, one of the experts commissioned to work with Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission from 2001 to 2003, was presented by the lawyers for the victims’ families as the last national expert for this trial, thus concluding the trial’s expert phase. During this session, Degregori said Fujimori applied a double strategy in the counter-subversive struggle, which allowed for the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta crimes.
1. Incidents during the hearing
Though Alberto Fujimori’s daughter, Keiko Sofía Fujimori, gave a press conference for Congress on Sept. 8 where she confirmed her father’s good health, the Court has not yet announced the results of Fujimori’s medical tests. Since the Court is legally obligated make public any information regarding the defendant’s health, it appears the Court has not been notified of these exams to date.
2. Degregori – Among the most important parts of what the Peruvian expert said:
The Peruvian government’s counter-subversive struggle since 1980
As mentioned in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s Final Report, during the early 1980s, the subversive group Shining Path claimed the greatest number of victims.
According to reports from Amnesty International, due to the progress of Shining Path’s violent attacks between 1982 and 1984, democracy was set aside. According to the United Nations and human rights organizations, between 1989 and 1993, Peru had the most cases of arrested and disappeared persons of any country in the world.
Counter-subversive strategy in Fujimori’s government
During Fujimori’s government, in both the counter-subversive and political spheres, there was a double strategy:
1. A legal or daytime strategy
2. Another clandestine or nocturnal strategy, product of Fujimori’s lack of military understanding, which was useless: “His strategy was not only murderous, but also inefficient.” The expert also signaled that it is impossible Fujimori was unaware of this “dark strategy.”
As part of this dark strategy, the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta crimes were committed. Degregori claimed there are “beyond reasonable signs” indicating that the president, Fujimori, was aware of the Colina Military Detachment as well as the Barrios Altos and La Cantuta crimes. The expert also said that these crimes did not help defeat Shining Path. “It only brought about pain and disgrace for military institutions and the government. It was a disastrous chapter in Peru’s history.”
Since the coup d’état on April 5, 1992 — referred to as the “self-coup” in Peru since the executive power dissolved the legislative and judicial powers with the help of the armed forces — the separation of powers collapsed and Alberto Fujimori had all the power, with support from Vladimiro Montesinos as a “key part” of intelligence.
Shining Path’s alleged “strategic equilibrium”
According to Degregori, Shining Path had not reached “strategic equilibrium,” given that in 1992 the subversive group had already suffered a strategic blow in rural areas and hard hits in the cities.
Fujimori used his power to comment during the trial and said that in his government, “there was no day or night policy” and that he himself “assumed the political, not military, direction of the counter-subversive struggle where the acts occurred.”
3. Next session
Analysis of means of proof: document, written and audiovisual evidence
Having concluded the trial’s first and second phases (witnesses and experts, respectively), Monday, Sept. 22, the third phase of the trial, involving means of proof, will begin. The Court has requested to meet with the prosecution (including the public prosecutor and the lawyers for the victims’ families) and the defense beforehand to discuss the quality and quantity of the proof of means to be presented, in order to prevent prolonging this phase.