Fujimori on Trial :: Fujimori procesado

Accountability in Action :: Rindiendo cuentas

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Witness says reform made the SIN the president’s only intelligence information source

March 21st, 2008 · No Comments

 Juan Berteti Carazas.

March 16, 2008

Thirty-eighth session. Military officials Juan Berteti Carazas and Miguel Enrique Rojas García (both active) testified in the hearing as well as Juan Rivero Lazo. All three were summoned by the state prosecutor.

Juan Berteti Carazas.

Berteti was the direct boss of Aquilino Portella Núñez on July 18, 1992 when the Cantuta crime was committed.

The day before, on July 17, the witness said he received a phone call from Carlos Miranda Balarezo, ordering him to relieve Aquilino Portella Núñez from his charge since he had to “leave to complete a mission,” without giving any further details on this mission.

The day of the murder, Portella Núñez met with Miranda Balarezo in his office. The witness said they looked “very concerned […] they were secretive and said that they were leaving because they had very delicate problems.”

Miguel Rojas García.

Rojas worked in the Army Intelligence Service (SIE) in 1992-1993.

  1. From January to June 1992 he was head of instruction in the SIE.
  2. From June to December 1992, he was head of research in the SIE.
  3. In 1993, he was head of SIE counter-intelligence.

While he held these positions, he said he never knew about any special intelligence team in the SIE or about the selection of officials and arms to the Army Intelligence Directorate (DINTE).

After the coup d’état on April 5, 1992, Alberto Fujimori lived in the SIE installations next to the office of SIE head, Alberto Pinto Cárdenas.

Even though he was one of the heads of the SIE, he never wrote a report on the Cantuta murder or held any meeting to evaluate the crime.

The SIE basements served to imprison various important leaders in subversive group Shining Path for several days: Martha Huatay, Osmán Morote, Laura Zambrano, María Pantoja and Víctor Zavala Cataño. By order of Oliveros Pérez, the witness transferred them to the Naval Base for “five, six or eight days,” for a supposed “Peace Accord.” At night, he also saw Vladimiro Montesinos and Oliveros Pérez talking with the Shining Path members.

Rojas said he never saw a civilian held in these basements. He also confirmed that the basements served to imprison people who were not army personnel.

Juan Rivero Lazo.

When he graduated from military school, he met Vladimiro Montesinos, who he said did not offer him the position of DINTE director. Rivero supposedly met again with Montesinos after he assumed the position in 1991. That year, the DINTE sub-directorate was headed by Carlos Indacochea Ballón, also one of Montesinos’ old classmates.

He denied having taken command of the Colina detachment, as have other witnesses in previous sessions:

  1. Julio Chuqui Aguirre
  2. José Concepción Alarcón Gonzáles
  3. Cléver Pino Benamú
  4. Víctor Silva Mendoza, said that this was a “death squad” formed by Rivero’s order.

According to Rivero Lazo, “Everything they say is false if they can’t prove it.”

He said that the DINTE is higher up than the SIE and that the SIE gave information to DINTE Intelligence. However, he later testified that the SIE did not have to report its operations plans.

He also denied having authorized the head of the DINTE economic department to provide a budget for the supposed detachment and that his directorate never received a budget from the National Intelligence Service (SIN).

As head of the DINTE, he reported daily to the Commander General (Nicolás de Bari Hermoza in 1992) and to the Commander in Chief.

            On army intelligence: He said it was a matter of looking for and processing information. Since no activity in the army is public and intelligence isn’t either, in the search for information in order to be processed, the activities are somewhere between what is considered legal and illegal.

            On the National Intelligence Service (SIN): Through a reform in 1991, all the intelligence information of the Armed Forces and National Police was channeled through the SIN, in order to be transmitted to Fujimori. According to Rivero, the person who assumed the position of SIN head was Gen. Julio Salazar Monroe and not Vladimiro Montesinos, as has been said to date. The intelligence directors of the armed institutes who reported to the SIN were: Antonio Ibárcena Amico of the National Marines, Antonio Ketín Vidal of the National Police Force, and Juan Rivero Lazo.

            On Barrios Altos: As head of the DINTE, he never learned that the trucks they had bought were used for the Barrios Altos murders, despite various journalistic reports that have said the opposite.

Next week, Juan Rivero Lazo will continue his testimony and Umberto Jara, Luis Pérez Documet and Luis Rojas Neyra have also been summoned to testify.

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