Fujimori on Trial :: Fujimori procesado

Cléver Pino Benamú.

March 12, 2008

Thirty-fifth session. Cléver Pino Benamú, sub-director of the Army Intelligence Directorate (DINTE) in 1991 — when the Colina group was formed — testified in this session.

Among the most important aspects of Pino Benamú’s testimony were:

1. Meetings between Santiago Martin Rivas, Vladimiro Montesinos and Fujimori

Due to reports given within the intelligence community, the witness said he knew that Martin Rivas, Montesinos and Fujimori met periodically in National Intelligence Service (SIN) offices before the formation of the Colina detachment. 

However, this is what was told to him; the witness did not directly take part in the meeting, which is why he could not entirely prove it.

In accordance with the changes made by Fujimori in 1991, the DINTE was subordinate to the SIN.

2. Formation of the Colina military detachment

According to Pino Benamú, this detachment was formed in two phases:

a. Analysis group.

The creation of this “analysis group” in January 1991 — the same group that received written praise from former president Alberto Fujimori — was the foundation for what later became the Colina detachment.

At this time, Rivero Lazo, head of the DINTE, ordered that the group be supervised. In March 1991, Pino Benamú questioned this group’s work, since the supposed work was copied from leaflets sold in the center of Lima.

Due to his questioning, Rivero Lazo ordered the supervision to be stopped, saying that he himself would do it.

Rivero Lazo did not have the logistical training necessary to supervise, rather it was Pino Benamú’s office — sub-directorate of the internal front — that was prepared and assigned to carry out this task. Even so, the witness said he was no longer in charge of following the analysis group.

The witness said he never found out about the supposed manual produced by the analysis group and had believed they were unable to complete it due to the members’ limited preparation in intelligence.

b. Colina military detachment.

In August 1991, the members of the “analysis group” formed the military detachment or “operative intelligence group.” Pino Benamú’s belief is that the span between January and August was a waiting period, meaning that the actual work done by the analysis group itself didn’t matter much since they were working on creating a special intelligence detachment.

In principle, the group never had the formal name of “Colina”; however, “Colina” was used more and more until the entire Peruvian army began to call it by that name.

The detachment was not a secret; it was known among the offices of the Army General Command since the group’s members — overall Martin Rivas — flaunted their power in front of the other officials. Furthermore, Marin Rivas had been involved in illicit activities in the army’s war on terrorism since 1985.

3. Barrios Altos Crime

1. Days after the Barrios Altos crime, Rivero Lazo summoned the DINTE and SIE colonels to attend a meeting, where he asked for their recommendations on how to act in order to “get out of this problem.” The DINTE inspector colonel said, “Unfortunately these boys have made a mistake.”

2. At this meeting, Silva Mendoza, head of the SIE, responded that this was the DINTE’s problem, not the SIE’s, since the DINTE was in charge of the detachment. Rivero Lazo remained silent and did not respond.

3. After this, the company COMPRAMSA was created since no one wanted to be held responsible for the group or have it under their command.

It is important to note that though the detachment was moved, the military officials remained part of the Peruvian army. According to what Fujimori testified, he supposedly found about out this group’s existence much later, in 1993.

4. Corruption in the Peruvian army

1. The first days in January 1991, Rivero Lazo told Pino Benamú that from then on, the DINTE would have a larger budget from the SIN. Though on one hand this would be advantageous in order to carry out better intelligence work, there was no supervision on the amount given for the budget and it did not follow official channels.

2. In 1991, when meetings were carried out in all sectors of national intelligence, an agenda was made and carried out by the assistants of the SIN head — at that time Julio Salazar Monroe, although everyone knew that the person who went the meetings and who was in practice the SIN head was Vladimiro Montesinos Torres.

3. Even the army general commander in 1991, Pedro Villanueva Valdivia, was pushed to the sidelines. He had to create an “Anti-Subversive Counseling Group,” in charge of collecting intelligence information, so that he could be informed on intelligence issues.

Though Villanueva would have to retire at the end of December 1991, he was taken out one month before since he opposed the change to the Law on the Military Situation, which in practice permitted Montesinos to discharge generals and colonels.

After Villanueva retired, Nicolás de Bari Hermoza Ríos was named army commander general. Consequently, Hermoza Ríos laid out the anticipated changes in the military regions; in the Second Military Region in Arequipa, Rodolfo Robles was named general.

4. In 1993, Pino Benamú met with Gen. Rodolfo Robles — who was already working as army commander in instruction and doctrine and who, according to military norm, would be in line to assume the army general command — and told him everything he knew about the Colina detachment. To the witness, it appeared that Robles was already aware of the group’s activities.

Pino Benamú is the first official of high rank in army intelligence not to testify that he is unaware of these happenings. On the contrary, he has accepted that in the offices of the Army General Command, both the existence of the Colina military detachment and its crimes were known.

Despite the army’s knowledge of the crimes committed, the group was kept around and, moreover, by June 1992 when the group had already committed various crimes, Commander General Hermoza Ríos praised the group.

To date, the Army General Command has not made a public statement.

Plan Condor. Apart from this trial, Pino Benamú agreed to give information on Argentine and Uruguayan citizens during the 1970s when Operation Condor functioned in various South American countries. Currently, another former Peruvian president, military official Remigio Morales Bermúdez (1975-1980) is being investigated by the Italian judiciary for crimes related to Operation Condor activities.

In the next session on March 14, José Velarde Astete and Juan Alberto Berteti Carazas have been summoned to testify. Both will give their testimony on the Cantuta University killings.